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EFFECT OF OUTCOME KNOWLEDGE ON REPEATED PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATIONS 
Russell Calk, New Mexico State University 
Maryanne Mowen, Oklahoma State Uni versity 
Outcome information has been shown to have a significant impact ou pe1jormance evaluations in a wide 
variety of decision settings. Studies of outcome effects on performance evaluation typically e..\:amine a 
one-time decision. Often, however, managers must repeatedly evaluate performance. This study examines 
how outcome information affects the revision of multiple pe1jormance evaluations over time. The results 
have importalll implications for research into the sensitivity of evaluators to the sequence of the receipt of 
positive and negative information. Implications of these results for performance evaluation in multiple 
areas of business are discussed. 
INTROD UCTION 
Outcome effects ha ve been shown to have a 
significant impact on performance evaluati ons (Ghosh 
and Lusch, 2000 ; Luckett and Eggleton, 199 1 ). The 
result is robust across a wide varie ty of dec is ion settings 
including financial di stress (Tuttl e and Stocks, 1998; 
Fisher and Sel ling, 1993) , capital budgeting (Brown and 
Solomon, 1987, 1993; Cheng et al. , 2003), investment 
choices (Frederickson e t a l. , 1999) , personne l dec isions 
(Highhouse and Ga ll o, 1999) , corporate branding 
strategy (Agrawal and M aheswaran, 2005) , and 
accounting variance in vestigations (Lipe, 1993). The 
typica l study of the innuence of outcome effects on 
perfom1ance evaluations examines an iso lated ind ividua l 
in a one-time, we ll de fin ed deci s ion setting under 
conditions that ignore organi zational characteristics 
(Ashton, 1990) . 
Perfom1ance eva luation , however, is a dynami c 
process and is important to both the eva luator and the 
evaluatee. Frequentl y, managers are req uired to 
repeatedl y eva luate the perfom1ance of the sa me person 
or team over a period of time. ln thi s setting, eva luators 
continuously revise and update prior-period eva lu ation s 
as new in formation becomes ava il ab le, a process Hogarth 
and Einhom ( 1992) ca ll beli ef re vis ion Severa l studi es 
of audit deci s ion makin g have shown that prior period 
evaluations are revised in thi s manner (W il ks, 2002 ; 
Ashton and Ashton , 1988: Asa re. 1992: and T ubbs et a l. . 
1990, 1993). In o utcome-based perfom1ance eva luati on 
schemes, eva luators fo cus the ir attention on ac tua l 
outcomes (Brown and So lomon , 1993 ; Frederi ckson , 
1992; Frederi ckson et al. . 1999). 
The purpose of thi s study is to link the stud ies of 
o utcome-based performance evaluation and o f belief 
revis ion by examining how outcome information impacts 
belief revis ion over time in the process of repeated 
performance eva luations. We base our study on the 
Hogarth and Einhorn ( 1992) model which posits tha t 
recency effects outweigh primacy e ffects. T hat is, later 
o utcomes have a stronger impact on eva luations than 
earlier outcomes. In addition, thi s model suggests that the 
impact of the more recent outcomes dimini shes over 
time. O ur study is designed to test that asserti on . Our 
s tudent subj ects were given fi ve evaluations to make over 
a period of five da ys . The results show that there is a 
s ignifi can t contrast effect such that recent in formation 
that conlTasts with previous information is dramaticall y 
overwei ghted . Furthem1ore. the effect does not dimini sh 
over time . 
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T hi s study is the first study o f outcome eva luations 
over mul tipl e time peri ods. As such, it contribu tes to the 
important area of management accounting research on 
performance eva luati on. It a lso holds imp li cations for 
other streams of lite ra ture in whi ch eva luati ons must be 
made over a seri es of time peri ods, such as the 
detem1inari on o f a bank 's loan port fol io strength, 
va ri ance in ves ti ga tion, or adve rti s ing agency efforts. T he 
s tud y may a lso ho ld impli ca ti ons for nonbusi ness fie lds 
such as the eva I uation of ran kings of sports teams. 
T he rema inder of thi s paper is organi zed as fo llows. 
T he nex t sec ti on di sc usses a mode l of systematic belief 
rev is ion. Sect ions 3 and 4 desc ribe the met hodo logy and 
present an ana lysis o f the resu lt s. T he fi nal secti on offers 
some conclud in g remarks and suggestions fo r fut ure 
resea rch. 
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Model of Systematic Belief Revision 
. T he periodic eva luation of empl oyees by managers 
mvo l ves the systematic revis ion of prior eva! uations 
based upon the in trod uction of new evidence. With thei r 
be lief adjustment model, Hogarth and Einhorn ( 1992), 
propose a structure fo r syste matic be lief revi sion . Whil e 
other mode ls of be lief revis ion ex ist, the l-IE Model has 
been shovvn to "capture both the direction and magn itude 
o f auditors' belief revis ion ." (Kri hnamoorthy, 1999: 
105). We be li eve that the manager ' s pe rfonnance 
eva luation task is sufficientl y s imilar to the eva luation 
ta sk of auditors that the HE Mode l provides a good 
theore ti cal bas is for cons ide ring be li e f revis ion . 
In the HE Mode l, be li efs are rev ised based upon the 
effect that the intTod ucti on o f new evidence has on an 
in itia l anchor. In an outcome-based performance 
eva luat ion scheme, the prio r peri od 's eva luation serves as 
the anchor and s ubsequent actual outcomes are treated as 
new evidence and inc luded in to be li e f adj ustment mode l. 
According to the HE Mode l, no t a ll eva luators wi ll 
place the same we ig ht on a new bit o f informati on. 
Furthem1ore, the impac t of new infonnation on the initi a l 
anchor is dependent on the directi on o f the ev idence. 
T hat is, a person may be so invested in a be lief or 
deci s ion ( the ancho r) tha t evidence confirming the 
anchor w ill be we ighted muc h more heavily than 
di sconfirming evidence. Over time, as informa ti on 
accumula tes and eva luato rs become more committed to 
their be li efs, the impact of new evidence w ill d imini sh. 
For exampl e , suppose tha t the actua l o utcome 
reported by a subo rdina te manager is s ignifi ca ntl y lower 
(hi ghe r) than the ex pec ted o utcome. As a result the 
eva luator g ives the s ubordinate a low (h igh) perfon~ancc 
eva luation . For the next pe ri od , the ac tua l o utcome is 
aga in lower (hi ghe r) than ex pec ted. T he e va lua to r ma y o r 
may no t p lace a s ignifi ca nt s ubj ecti ve we ight on thi s new 
info rma tion so tha t the eva lua ti on may or may not 
change. T hus, a ft er severa l pe ri ods, the impac t of the 
reported res ults on the per formance eva lua ti on sho ul d 
dim ini sh so that regard less o f how actua l result s compare 
to expec ta tio ns, the eva lua ti on w ill rema in essentiall y 
unchan ged from the prev io us period. 
The mode l o f thi s phenomeno n deve lo ped by Hoga rth 
and [i nborn ( 1992) appears as fo ll ows: 
S, 1l s(x,) - S, 1l ( I) 
and 
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where : 
sk is the eva luation for pe riod k . 
a is the sensitivity towards reported results that 
di sconfirm the previous evaluation, and 0 .<::::a. 
~ is the sens itivity towards reported results that 
confim1 the prev ious eva luation, and~ .<:::: 1. 
xk is the reported result in period k. 
s(xk) is the subj ec tive weight that the evaluator places 
on the reported results in pe riod k. 
T he mode l simpl y states that the eva luation in period 
k is equa l to the pri or period 's eva luation plus some 
adjustment. T he adjustment is a fu nction of both the 
s ubj ective we ight p laced on the cwTent period 's reported 
results and the eva luator 's sens iti vity towards thi s 
add iti ona l informati on. Eq ua ti on ( I ) applies to reported 
res ul ts tha t d isconfim1 the prev iou eva lua tion. Equation 
(2) app li es to reported results tha t confirm the previous 
eva lua ti on. 
The va lues of a and~ a re fun c ti ons o f both individua l 
and s itua ti ona l var iabk<>. Some eva luators may weight 
confirming results hi gher than di sconfinning outcomes, 
o r vice versa. The same eva luator may a lso place 
difiCrent we ights on reported results in different 
s ituati ons. 
In Hoga rth and Ei nhorn 's ( 1992) expe rimental work, 
s ubjec ts were split into two groups - condition I and 
condi tion 2. In both conditi o ns, subj ects were g iven an 
ini tia l piece or in forma tion and asked to make an 
eva lua tion . T hen the subj ec ts in conditi on I were g iven a 
second piece or info rmat ion that was bette r than the firs t" 
the subj ec ts in condition 2 we re g iven a second piece of 
informa ti on that was worse than the firs t. As ex pected, 
the subj ec ts g ive n the better (worse) infom1ation ra ised 
( lowered) the ir eva luations. Fina ll y, the subj ec ts in 
conditi on I were g iven a third pi ece o f infonnation that 
wa s worse tha n the second pi ece, whil e the subjects in 
cond it ion 2 received a third pi ece o f information that was 
better than the ~econd piece . Importa ntl y, the average of 
the three pi eces o l' informat ion was identica l in both 
cond iti o ns. T he results revea led tha t the third eva luati on 
wa s muc h lowe r lor the firs t conditi on and muc h hi gher 
lor the second cond iti on. T his is known as the ··fi shtail 
cfl'ec t. " Shown graph icall y in Ex hi bit l , subj ects in 
conditi on I rece ived a di sconlirming third p iece of 
in fo rmat ion that was negat ive , and tha t resulted in a 
cons ide rabl y lower eva lua ti on than that g iven the firs t 
p1cce . Subj ec ts in cond ition 2, on the o the r hand, 
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received a di sconfirming third piece o f information that that was considerabl y higher than that g iven the fir t 
was positive, and those subj ects awarded an eva luation piece. 
Ex.hJb it I 
E va luatio n 
80 





0 0 . 5 1 . 5 2 
t i rne p e rio d 
Hogarth and E inhorn ( 1992) use the results of th is 
experiment to argue that recency (the most recent piece 
of information) has a stronger e ffec t on people' s 
evaluations than does primacy (the ini tia l pi ece of 
information) . Even so, and regardless of individ ual and 
situational variables, over a long seri es of evaluations, 
they believe that evaluators sho uld become more 
committed to the ir be li efs and, there fo re, the va lues of a 
and p should approach zero . As thi s happens, the 
performance eva luation in period k should become 
equivalent to the evaluation in period k-1. [n other words, 
the HE Modei pos its that over time, as one rece ives more 
and more informati on, s/he should become more 
committed to hi s/her views, and new in formation should 
have little to no effect. This leads to the fo llowing 
hypothes is. 
Hypothesis: T he impact of o utcome in fom1ation on 
performance eva luation will dimini sh over time. 
To study thi s hypothes is, we created an experiment in 
which subj ects used report ed acco unti ng resul ts to 
repeatedly eva luate the perfo rmance of the same team. ln 
a resul ts-based contro l system, accounti ng in fo rmati on is 
o ften used to assess the actua l results (McNa ir 1994) . 
The reported acco un ting results serve as outcome 
in fo nnation in the perfo rmance eva luation ~ c heme . 
METHODOLOGY 
T he experiment is a mi xed des ign with four between 
subj ect treatments and repea ted measures of eva lua ti ons 
ac ross five time periods. T he va ri ab le manipul ated is the 
2 . 5 3 
{ e Con d i6o n I 
--- C o n d itio n 2 
3 . 5 
Ss' rating of the groups ' performance. 
T here were four between subjects treatments . Each 
subj ect was presented w ith a fo lder contain ing the 
scenario in appendix A, the manipul ation check in 
appendi x B, and the first of five evaluat ion forms . Each 
evaluati on fonn was s imi lar to the one presented in 
appendix C. T he scenari o a ked the subj ects to ro le-play 
that they were the regiona l manager whose job inc luded 
the monthl y eva luation of the per formance of an 
interd isc ip linary team . T he team 's obj ective was to 
reduce tota l assembl y costs to the va lue-added level. The 
makeup o f the team, the problem they fa ced, the decision 
that was reached , and the expected resul ts were the same 
across a ll trea tments. Only the actua l results vari ed 
across the fo ur trea tments. 
ln treatments I and 2, the actua l results exceeded 
expected results in the first fo ur periods. In period 5, 
however. actu nl results exceeded ex pected resul ts for 
trea tment 1, but actua l re ul ts were les than expected 
resu lts fo r treatment 2 . ln other words, subj ec ts in 
tTea tment 1 received a confirming outcome for the team 
in period 5, whil e subj ects in tTeatment 2 rece ived a 
d iscon fi rmi ng o utcome. In treatments 3 and 4 , the actual 
result s were le s than ex pected result in the fir st fo ur 
peri ods. In pen od 5, howe\'er, ac tual re ult continued to 
be less than expected results fo r trea tment 3, but actua l 
resul ts were grea ter than expec ted results fo r trea tment -l . 
In other words. subj ec ts in treatment 3 rece ived a 
con fim1in g o utcome for the tea m in period 5 , while 
subjects 111 trea tment -+ rece ived a d iscon fi rm ing 
outcome . A mappi ng of the actua l outcomes for the 
treatment is shO\\'n in ex hibit 2. 
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Exhibit 2: Treatment Mapping 
Period 
Treatment I 2 3 4 5 
I A>c A>e A>e A>c A>e 
2 A>e A>e A>e A>e a< E 
3 a< E a< E a< E a< E a< E 
4 a< E a< E a< E a< E A>e 
A > e means that the actua l results were greater than expected 
a < E means that the actu al resul ts were less than expec ted . 
Repeated measures of the evaluati ons were collected 
on five consecutive class days . The folders were returned 
to the subj ects with one additional " monthly" evaluation 
forn1 included. A lthough the subjects were identified on 
the folders, they were not identified with the completed 
eva luation forms. Ten subj ects who missed at least one 
of the five c lass meetings were exc luded from the study. 
Subj ects were 38 undergraduate students enrolled in 
principles o f managerial accounting at a southwestern 
university. Exhibit 3 provides detail s about the subjects. 
Exhibit 3: Descriptive Statistics for Sample 
Major . 
Accounti ng 18 
Econornt cs I 
Finance 4 
Mana gement 13 





Ra nge 18 - 47 
Med ian 22 
Mean 25 
T here were no s ignifi ca nt differences in academi c 
abili ty (as measured by course grade) , age, c lassifi cation 
(sophomore, junior, etc .), e thni c ity, or gender between 
groups. 
As a contro l to ensure tha t evalua ti ons across the four 
treatments would vary o nl y because of the outcome 
e ffect, the subj ec ts repea ted the dec is ion process faced 
by the hypothetical group by completing the 
manipulation check. S ubj ects who did no t reach the same 
dec ision as the group were exc luded fro m the study. In 
tota l, four subj ects were e liminated . Fisher and Selling 
( 1993) show tha t the e ffec t o f outcome information 
di mini shes w hen the eva luator obse rves the dec is ion rul e 
of the person being evalua ted . Thus, ha ving the subj ec ts 
repeat the dec is ion process of the group being eva lua ted 
co ul d bi as the results. Ho we ve r, the puq)o e o f thi s stud y 
is not to test for o utco me e ffects. Instead , given that an 
outcome e ffec t ex ists, we are try ing to dete rmine whether 
the impact o f the o utcome in formatio n on the pe ri odi c 
perfo rmance eva luat ion dimini shes over time. 
Four subj ec ts, two from trea tment 2 and two from 
treatment 4 , we re e limina ted . One subj ect ' s fin a l 
eva luation represented a large deviation in di rection from 







Afri can Arnen can 2 
Hispan ic 8 
Wh ite 26 
Other 2 
those of the o ther subj ec ts in the group. That subject ' s 
group rece ived informati on that showed actual results to 
be much lower than expected . T hi s subj ect then 
s ignifi cantl y ra ised hi s/her eva luati on . The other three Ss 
were e limi nated in order to ba lance the groups in tem1s 
o f number o f subj ects (so fi ve subj ects remained in each 
group). T hus, the fin al sampl e s ize was twenty. Inclusion 
o f the three subj ec ts has no impac t on the results . 
Results 
As a man ipul ati on check to en ure that subj ects relied 
upon the actua l results as part of the eva luation process, 
the data were fi rst tested fo r the presence of an outcome 
e ffec t. Tabl e I presents an ANOV A comparing the mean 
eva lua ti ons for each o f the four b·ea tment in period I. 
The o vera ll mode l is s ignifi ca nt (p = 0 .01 ). Since 
trea tments I and 2 and trea tments 3 and 4 are identica l in 
the lirst period, the fo ll owin g contrast is a lso tested . 
L, = / , +12, - /" - /4 , = 0 
where 1,, = the mean eva luati on for trea tment i in period). 
The con trast is s ignifi cant (p = 0 .0033), thus showing the 
presence o f an o utcome e ffect in the first period. 
234 
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Table 1: ANOV A for Period 1 of Treatments 1 - 4 
Source df Sum of So u ares 
Model 3 1406.15 
L, I II 70.45 
Error 16 1576.80 
Corrected total 19 2982.95 
Is the outcome effect diminishes over time. To 
examine thi s issue, the mean evaluations within each 
treatment are compared over the five periods. Tables 2 -
5 present the ANOV A results for each treatment. The 
following sixteen orthogonal contrasts are tested to 
determine the differences in mean evaluations over time 
within each of the four treatments. 
Ll = til + ti2 + t /3 + ti4 - 4tis 
L2 = til + ti2 + ti3 - 3ti4 
L3 = til + ti2 - 2ti3 
L4 =ill - ti2 
Mean Square F- va lue p-va luc 
468.7 1 4.756 0.0 148 
11 70.45 \1 .877 0.0033 
98.55 
If evaluators do become so committed to the ir beliefs 
that they are re luctant to revise evaluation scores, we 
would not expec t any of the contrasts to be 
significant. 
Interestingly, L , is sign ificant for treatments 2 and 4 
(p = 0 .0 1 and p = 0 .01 , respectively), but none of the 
other fourteen contrasts is s ignificant. Significant 
revis ions on ly occur when outcomes that contradict pri or 
periods occur. Over time, the ~ va lue in equation (2) 
approaches zero, so that current eva luations are equal to 
previous evaluations , but the a value in equation ( I ) 
remains large. 
Table 2: ANOV A for Periods 1 - 5 of Treatment 1 
Source df Sum of Squares Mea n Square F - value p-va lue 
Model 4 44 .24 11 .06 0.173 0.9500 
L, I 0.64 0.64 00 10 0 .92 1 J 
L2 I 38 .40 38.40 0.600 0.44 76 
L, I 4.80 4.80 0.075 0.7870 
L., I 0.40 0.40 0 .006 0.9390 
Error 20 1281.60 64 .08 
Corrected tota l 24 1325.84 
Table 3: ANOV A for Periods 1 - 5 of Treatment 2 
So urce df Sum of Squares Mean Square F - va lue p-value 
Model 4 375 1.44 937 .86 9.146 0.0002 
L, I 3745.44 3754.44 36.527 0.000 1 
L2 I 4 .27 4.27 0.042 0.8397 
L, I 0.83 0 .83 0.008 0.9296 
L., I 0 .90 0.90 0 009 0.9254 
Error 20 2050 80 102 .54 
Corrected total 24 5802 .24 
Table 4: ANOV A for Periods 1 - 5 of Treatment 3 
Source df Sum of Squares Mean Square F - value p-value 
Model 4 152 .56 38. 14 0. 133 0.968-l 
L, I 34.8 1 3-1 .81 0 .121 0 73 16 
L2 I 30.82 30 82 0. 107 0.7-1 70 
L, I 8.53 8.53 0.030 0 .86-1 2 
L, I 78.4 78 .j 0 273 0 6070 
Error 20 574 1.60 287 08 
Corrected total 24 5894 .16 
235 
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Table 5: ANOV A for Periods 1 - 5 of Treatment 4 
Source df Sum of Squares 
Mode l 4 1294 .00 
L, I 11 90.25 
L2 I 33 .75 
L, I 7.50 
L., I 62 .50 
Error 30 1870.00 
Correc ted tota l 34 3 164.00 
In other words, when the group reports actua l resul ts 
that are consistent with the prior peri od's evaluation, no 
revision in the evaluation takes pl ace. However, when 
disconfinning results are reported, a signifi cant revision 
in the current eva luati on takes pl ace. Thus, the direction 
of the evidence seems to be a sign ifi ca nt factor. 
The impact of direc tion o f evidence is perhaps better 
illustrated by the graph of the data shown in exhibit 4 . 
Mean Square F - va lue p-value 
323 .50 3.460 0 .0265 
11 90 25 12.730 000 19 
33 .75 0 .36 1 0 .5547 
7.50 0 .082 0.7776 
62.50 0 .668 0.4234 
93.50 
The mean evaluations for trea tments I and 2 and 
treatments 3 and 4 are relatively equal for the first four 
periods, as one would expect. ln the fifth period, as 
outcomes that are consistent with previous periods are 
reported for treatments I and 3, the mean evaluations 
remain unchanged. However, as outcomes that contradict 
previous peri ods are reported for treatments 2 and 4, 
s ignificant revisions o f the mean evaluations occur. 
Exhibit 4: Mean Evaluations for Treatmentj in Period t 
120 
1 00 
?s( 8 0 ;== ~ ~ 




P o n od 
Notice that in the fifth peri od the mean eva luat ion fo r 
trea tment 4, whi ch reported lower than ex pected 
outcomes in every period except the last, is even hi gher 
than the mean eva luation for trea tment I, which reported 
hi gher than ex pected outcomes in every peri od . The 
expected and reported outcome arc equi va lent in period 
5 fo r both trea tments. A t-test of thi s ditTcrcncc reveals 
that it is stati sti ca lly signifi ca nt (t = 2.54, p = 0.0 174) . 
Likewi e, the ex pec ted and ac tua l results to r trea tments 2 
and 3 arc the same in the !ifth peri od, but the Ss' mean 
eva luati on for trea tment 2 is lower, although the result 
mi sses stat isti ca l s igni fi ca nee (t = 1.3 3, p = 0.1 I 0 I). 
DI SCUSSION 
Thi s study links the resea rch on outcome-based 
perfo rmance eva luati on and be li ef revision by 
inve ti ga ting the impli cations of the ll ogarth and Einhorn 
( 1992) model for performance eva luati on over a series of 
time peri ods. In their mode l o f beli e f re vision, Hogarth 
and Einhom ( 1992) assert that over time, as decision-
makers become committed to a parti cular belie f, their 
sensit ivity towards all new in forma tion, confirming or 
di sconfinn ing, will diminish. In the contex t of the 
eva luat ion of team performance in choo ing between 
a lternati ve projects, the results suggest that the sensitivity 
towa rds confirming evidence docs dimini sh, but the 
sensiti vity towards disconfirming evidence remains quite 
strong. Thus, we find that a series of simi lar performance 
measures, whether posit ive or nega ti ve, results in !lat 
eva luations. ll owevcr, if the last measure in the seri es is 
either hi gher or lower than the prev ious measures, there 
is a strong effect on the eva luati on . In fact, a positive 
endin g measure after a seri es of lower eva luations result 
in a hi gher eva luati on than is given by subjects who 
made a scncs of hi gher eva luati ons and then saw a 
nega ti ve end ing measure. Thi s is the fi shta i I effec t of the 
1-1 E model. 
There are at least two important imp lica ti ons from 
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these results. First, once an evaluatee is given a high 
(low) performance evaluation based on reported 
accounting results that are higher (lower) than expected , 
that person 's subsequent perfom1ance evaluati ons are not 
likely to ever become much higher (lower) . On the other 
hand, an evaluatee with a sequence of hi gh (low) 
performance evaluations who reports di sconfirming 
accounting results such those results are lower (higher) 
than expected will likely experience a significant 
decrease (increase) in performance eva luation score. In 
other words, a person with a high evaluation has nowhere 
to go but down, and a person with a low eva luation has 
nowhere to go but up . Thi s was true in our experiment 
even though the potentia l a lways ex isted to rai se or lower 
evaluations. 
Second, in our experiment, the reported accoun ti ng 
information resulted in hi gh or low perfom1ance 
evaluations regardless of the decision process used or the 
decis ion reached by the group be ing evaluated. T his 
suggests that eva luatees wou ld not be "puni shed" for 
poor decisions as long as reported accounting res ults are 
initially greater than expected and disconfirming 
accounting results do not occur. Of course, it would be 
hard to argue that a decis ion was poor if actual results are 
consistently hjgher than expected . More important, 
perhaps, is that evaluatees may be " re·wa rded" for poor 
decisions if di sconfinning in fom1ation is reported such 
that actual results are greater than expected and previous 
eva luations were low. Also, they may be "puni shed' ' for 
good dec isions when disconfim1ing accounting 
information is reported such that ac tua l results are less 
than expected and their previous eva luations were high. 
If eva luatees become aware of thi s dynamic , those with 
consistently high eva luations could reasonab ly be 
expected to become ri sk averse and those with low 
evaluations should be expected to become ri sk seeki ng in 
a manner consistent w ith the premise of prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tverksy, 1979). 
T hese findin gs have impl ications for multipl e areas of 
accounting and the other bus iness disciplines . The 
present research eva luated the per fo m1ance of teams. 
Additional research should investigate whether the 
findin gs apply to per fonnance eva luati on of ind ividua ls. 
For example, audit manager eva luations of junior 
members could be observed to see if the same pattern of 
results holds. For another exa mple, one can extrapo late 
to financial analysts' assessments of quarter ly earnings 
rep011s of indi vidual compani es and in vestigate w hether 
the same pattern of results wou ld ho ld. 
Journal of Business and Leadership: Research, Practi ce, and Teachi ng 
T he authors propose that the findin gs may generali ze 
from the perforn1ance of accoun ting teams to teams in 
other di sc iplines, such as marketing, finance , 
management, or information sciences. Other genera l 
bus iness contexts in w hich the research paradign1 may 
app ly inc lude evaluat ions in the fie lds of banking, 
marketing, and management. For instance, in banking the 
perforn1ance of loan officers is eva luated on the basis of 
the performance of their loan portfolios. ln a marketing 
context, sa les managers eva luate sa les personne l. 
Advertising executi ves eva luate the work of their staff on 
advertis ing. ln management, team performance is often 
the bas is of employee performance eva luation . 
Despite the be li ef of Hogarth and Einhorn ( 1992), that 
sen s itivity towards add itional evidence wil l d iminish, our 
resu lts show that sens itivity towards di sconfim1in g 
evidence is quite stTong. T hi s implies that there may be a 
deci s ion b ias, a single-data point bi as, which is 
remarkabl y s imilar to the fundamental attribution enor. 
Ni sbett and Ross ( I 980) proposed that peopl e have a bi as 
to att1i bu te the cause of outcomes to the person rather 
than the s itua tion . T he problem with thi s is that there can 
be many s ituationa l reasons for the change in outcome, 
unre lated to actual perfom1ance. These s ituational factors 
may include unex pected c hanges in the a va ilability of 
materia ls and labor, changes in overa ll economic 
conditions, or s imple variations in luck and chance. Any 
of these fa ctors can influence o utcomes over short 
periods of time . T he implication for eva luators is that 
changes in ratin gs or assessments should be based on 
more than one data point. Alternati ves include us ing 
moving averages, for examp le, as a means of avo iding a 
s ingle data point bias . 
In business, the balanced scorecard is an attempt to 
weight a vari ety o f outcomes in eva luating overall 
perfonnance . ( 1\...aplan and N orton, 1996; lttner e t a l. , 
2003) . Thi s continuing sens iti vity toward di sconfim1ing 
evidence is c lea r in bus ines education. Students 
frequentl y ask pro fesso rs to di sco unt an earli er poor 
~:,rrad e - po intin g out that a more recent hi gher grade 
shows ""w ha t they are reall y capable o f. " (It sho uld be 
noted that students. in these authors ' experi ence, have 
ne ve r argued the opposite .) Students a lso te nd to re ly on 
s itua ti ona l factors as an excuse fo r lower grades. It may 
be that the averag ing mode l commonly used by 
pro fessors to ass ign fi na l grades is a way o f reducing 
wei ght on ~1 lone data po int. In a s imil ar fa shi on . 
sta ti sti ca l contro l charts can he lp to miti ga te analys is of a 
lone da ta po int by showing contro l limits and 
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spotli •hling w heth -r or not a dal:J point is out side those 
limits. 
Future Resean:h 
Thi s study modeled the dynamic process o f" 
performance evaluati on by exa mining sensiti v it y towa rd 
new information over a number of" time peri ods. ll oga rlh 
and Einhorn ( 1992) offer no suggesti on as to how much 
Lime I S required f()r dec ision-makers to become 
commillcd to their bel iefs . Whil e thi s cx pl or;.Jtory study 
used a Lime linc of li ve peri ods, future resea rch should 
examine the cfTcc ls o r outco me informati on in shorter 
and longer Lime hori ;r.ons Lo determine il" the results 
shown persist. 
ll o •arlh and l ~ inho rn ( 1992) slate that eva luators' 
sensit iv ity to either conflm1ing or di sconflrming ev idence 
w i ll va ry amon g ind iv iduals as we ll as dirk renl dcc ision 
contexts. T he rev ision s lo prior peri od eva luati on s gi ven 
in equations ( I ) and (2) arc a func ti on o f both the 
evaluator ' s sensitivity towards the current period 's 
reported results and the s11hjectil'e lt'eig /Jt placed on thai 
information . I f" the we ight pla ced on the di sconllrming 
ev idence is large, the rev ision could be significa nt even if 
the evaluator 's sensi ti v ity tow~1rd s new informati on has 
dimini shed. Thi s stud y d id not d istin gui sh between the 
we ighting of th e ev idence and the scnsit iv1ty towards the 
ev idence. h1ture research shou ld invcsti •at e the 
determina nt s o f" the sensiti v ity and subj ect iVe wc ighti n ' 
varia bl es as we ll ~1 s th eir int cr;.J clton in making an 
eva luation . In addition , the ma •nitudc o r the diflcrence 
f'rom One period [0 lhc nex t ma y in teract Wllh the 
sensiti v ity and subj ect ive we i ·hi. Thi s ma gnitude may 
have a slron •cr imp~I C I than the <thso lul c V<IIUC o r lh l: 
chan ge alone. It is poss ible that larger in 1ti al d i i Tc ren c~.:s 
may strt.:n >then the prim ~t cy dlccl. Thi s k ind or rcsl:a rch 
o ilers more insi >hi iniO potc nli ~1J bi<J SCS o f 111an<Jge1·s and 
the way in w hi ch those hi <J scs m1 ·hi impact cv~tlu ~lli o n s . 
1:or cxampk, A ll ison ~.: 1 al . ( I CJC)O) round th ai out come 
b1 as is d:Jmp~.:ncd w hen need f(n <lCcuracy is h1 gh. Mackie 
c l <JI (200 I ) ro und thai outcome b i ~t s occ unu l w hen 
peop l · we re t";. tvor<thlc l ow~t rd the process tkll gencralcd 
the outl:omc. These arc l"ru JII"u l :1rc,1s !"or furl her rcsc: trch. 
There <IJ'c s ·ve ra ! l inlii ,J i ions lo the present rcsc;trch. 
Future rese<J reh should emp loy nOilSiudCill s<t nlplcs ami 
should 1nc ludc 'I brgc r sample si1.c . Secondl y , 'I 
i l llll [<li iOn o f" the present rcSGII'Ch IS I he USC o f" sce n,lri os. 
l'hcrt.: ;t1·e two allcm ;JI Jvc ' ippmacli cs lo sccn;JJ·ios. O ne is 
to erc;1l e true cxpcn mcnl s 111 w h1 ch suhj cc ls acl as 
eva lua tors '1nd observe the heh<t v1or <~1 1t l ou tcomes o l" 
J o u m~ l of nusincss ~ ncll .ca clc" liip : Rcscurch, l'rucLi cc, and Teaching 
confederates and eva luate those individual s. The second 
idea l situation is the usc o r actual business deci sion 
makin g over a seri es o r time pcri uds. Moving beyond 
pcrronnancc eva luati ons lo financia l evaluations, it is 
possible to as css the stock market 's reactions to 
compani es' quarterl y earnings report · and usc market 
data to test thc results. In thi s domain one might expect to 
sec a recency c rfcc l as market ex pec tations either are or 
arc not mel . 
Another fruitfu l area !"or further research is an 
exa minati on o r the impact or changes in direction or the 
info rmation over time. Thi s co uld be thought o r as mixed 
(confirm ing and di sconflrming) informati on. That is, 
would a "good news" - " bad news" - "good news" seri es 
o r di sc losurcs eventuall y lead to a steady-state 
(;Va luati on, or wou ld rcccncy dominate? 
In sum, thi s .' tudy prov ides insight into the dynamic 
process or repeated perfo rman ce (;Va luations. Su rely, thi s 
is one of the most compl ex and strc ·s f'ul tasks fac ing 
man:Jgcrs. The results support the ll oga rth and Einhorn 
( 1992) contenti on that pos iti ve or nega tive information 
rece ived after a ba:- l ine eva luati on result in a ·trong 
contr:Jst e ffec t. ll owcvcr, our results show that the 
imp:J cl or that ev idence on a seri es o r prcviou . 
cva lu:J ti ons docs not appea r to dimin ish over time. 
Instead, it remains strong. ;\n undcr · tandin g of the 
decision procl:ss uscd fo r pcrfo rmancc eva luati on 
should help managers in a w ide va ri t.:ty o r businc fi elds 
to lx ltcr determine the impact o r outcome informat ion on 
pnformancc eva luati on. 
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Appendi x A 
A part of it continuous impro ement pr gram, the . uth\\'e t Reg1on fAiph Co. h3~ rr.:\I S~d 11:- C)ntrt)l fram~'' orl-.. 
from the traditi onal functional structure and ha implemented ·everal cro · ·-fun tiOn3l tc3ms. R3thu tlun conductmt.: 
individual performance eva luati on on each team member. eac h t~am 1· ev luatcd collcctl\'el; . P~rr )rmancc re' l~,, ~. 
bonuses and other incenti ves of the team members are determined fr m th1 · te3m-ba - ~d performanc~ c,·3luat1 on . .- \ ~ 
Regional Manager you are personall y accountable for the perform3nce of the entire reg10n. I t~ ~ your r~ ~ron :; 1bil1t ) to 
conduct monthl y performance eva luati on for eac h team. You are all ' ' ed to d~termm~ t h~ cn t~na u::-~d m tilL· 
evaluation. 
The team for thi study consi t of a co t accountant. an indu tTI3l engineer and an op~r3 t lon~ man :~gcr. I he 
purpose of the team is to identi fy ways o f improving the ex i ting pro css of 3 semblmg comp ncnt part ::. ~o that thL· 
cost is reduced to the va lue-added le el. The engi neer ' re pon ibilit · i to identi fy al tcrna ti\'C" for impn.)\ mg the 
process. The accountant determine the re levant cost of implementation and c t a,·ing · of each alt~rnati\ 'C . l he 
operations manager determine the likelihood of achi ,-ing thee timated c t -a,•ing· ~rea h a lt ernati \C. !though 
the expected net finan cial benefit should be con idered as part of the dec1 ion pro es, the team member · ar~ allo,,ed 
and encouraged to use profess ional judgment in dec iding which alternative to impl ement. 
Appendix 13 
On June I , the team met to di cuss and choose between two impro,·ement alte rnati ve !\ vailablc resources :.~ rc 
sufficient to choose either alternati e A or a lternative 8 , bu t not both. Projected costs and benefi ts for ea ch a ltern:.J tl\ ~ 
have been submitted to you as part of the performance evalua ti on file and are given below. 
Altern a tive A 
Monlh Proj cclcd cosl of in.!.l!_l cmcnlalion Proj eclrd cos l '"' ing< 
I ~.000 $4.000 
2 $4.000 $6.000 
3 $3.000 $10,000 
4 $2.000 $10,000 
5 _ll 000 }.12 000 
lOla I B~ S4Q.QQQ 
Alt ern a ti ve B 
Monlb Projcc1cd cos! of implcmcnl alion Projec ted co 'l , ., in !!' 
I ~.000 $6.000 
2 _i6.000 s 12.000 
3 $4,000 $12.000 
4 $t.OOO $1 4 .000 
5 $1 000 SJ 6 000 
10131 ~ S60ll00 
Calculate the tota l net expec ted benefi t (loss) from lternatt\'e A. 
Calculate the tota l net expected benefit (loss) from Alternari,·e B. 












Which a lternati ve provides the grea te t net expected benefi!'J (Circ le on~) : A 8 
After consideri ng both a lternati ves, the team chose to implement alt~rnatl\~ 1:3 . 
Appendix C 
For the month of Jun~. the foll o,,·ing re-u lts '' ~r~ r~poncd to yo u h) th~ t~am . 
Eva lua te the tea m for the momh of June on a calc from (0- 100) ''~ r~ ;~ro 1s \~ry poor :.~nd 100 1-. C\C~lknt. 
Team e\·alua ti on ______ _ 
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